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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In  his  appellant’s  brief,  Mr.  Kincaid  argued  that  the  district  court  abused  its  discretion
when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and when it ordered him to pay two fines
to two separate victims.  He argued that his plea was involuntary because his counsel threatened
to withdraw if he did not plead guilty, and the district court abused its discretion in reaching the
opposite conclusion because it relied on precedent that had been implicitly overruled.  Regarding
the second issue, he argued that the statute under which the fines were imposed permitted only
one  fine.   The  State  agrees  that  the  statute  allowed  the  district  court  to  impose  only  one  fine.
However, the State claims that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Mr. Kincaid’s motion to withdraw his plea because it correctly found Mr. Kincaid’s plea was not
coerced.  This reply brief is necessary to address that argument.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Kincaid’s appellant’s brief.  They need not be repeated in this reply brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference.
2
ISSUES1
I. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Kincaid’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea?
II. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it ordered Mr. Kincaid to pay two fines of
$5,000 pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-5307?
1 This reply brief addresses issue one only.
3
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Kincaid’s Motion To Withdraw
His Guilty Plea
In State v. Grant, 154 Idaho 281, 285 (2013) (citations omitted), this Court held,
“[C]ounsel may not withdraw merely because his client refuses to plead guilty, or because
another attorney might possibly be able to convince the client to plead guilty.”  In denying
Mr. Kincaid’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, however, the district court—relying on
Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573 (1999)—wrote, “[I]f the client chooses not to follow the advice of
his attorney, counsel does have the right to withdraw.  Our courts have recognized that counsel’s
threat to withdraw is neither coercive, so as to make the defendant’s plea of guilty involuntary,
nor does it constitute ineffective assistance.”  (R., p.203.)  In Hollon,  this  Court  held  that
Mr. Hollon’s attorney was not deficient because an attorney could withdraw if his client refused
to plead guilty:  “[I]f counsel feels that they cannot support a client's choice, that counsel should
be allowed to withdraw, without then rendering a client's subsequent decision to enter into a
guilty plea, involuntary.”  132 Idaho at 577. Grant implicitly overruled Hollon on this issue, and
thus the district court failed to apply the correct legal standard.
In attempting to argue otherwise, the State claims Hollon and Grant can be “easily
reconciled” because the facts of the cases are different and they stand for different propositions.
(Resp.  Br.,  pp.8-10.)   The  State’s  protracted  argument,  however,  turns  on  distinctions  without
differences  and  fails  to  directly  address  the  problem that  the  two cases  reach  entirely  different
conclusions as to whether counsel can withdraw if his client refuses to plead guilty.  That the two
cases involved different facts and addressed different issues does not change this. Grant’s
statement  that  counsel  cannot  withdraw because  a  client  refuses  to  plead  guilty  is  this  Court’s
most recent pronouncement of the law on the issue and directly contradicts Hollon.
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Hollon and Grant reached these opposite conclusions by considering federal authority on
the issue that reflects the same division.  As the State points out, the Hollon Court cited to
Uresti v. Lynaugh, 821 F.2d 1099, 1102 (5th Cir. 1987).  (Resp. Br., p.7.)  The Grant Court,
however,  cited  to  a  Ninth  Circuit  case  that  was  not  yet  decided  when Hollon was issued:
Nehad v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 962, 971 (9th Cir. 2008).  154 Idaho at 285.  But in attempting to
argue that “a threat to withdraw might be coercive based on the facts of the case,” and that
Nehad can somehow be reconciled with Hollon (Resp. Br., p.10), the State ignores the fact that
Nehad made it clear that Uresti took the contrary position from it and several other circuits on
this issue. Nehad, 535 F.3d at 971 (noting Uresti held that “attorney’s threat to request to
withdraw and find replacement counsel if defendant did not plead guilty was unproblematic”).
Nevertheless, the State focuses on Mr. Kincaid’s statements at the change of plea hearing
instead of responding to the argument that federal courts—some of which were cited in Nehad—
considering this issue have held a defendant can rebut the presumption of truth attached to those
statements if he proves his counsel threatened to withdraw if he did not plead guilty.  (App.
Br., pp.10-11.)  Proof of such coercion calls those statements into doubt. See Heiser v. Ryan,
951 F.2d 559, 561-62 (3d Cir. 1991).  In fact, after citing to Heiser and other cases focusing on
this issue—as well as a threat to withdraw if a client insists on testifying—the Nehad court
stated, “this jurisprudence confirms that it is improper for a lawyer to threaten to withdraw if his
client does not follow his advice on a matter of fundamental importance to the representation,
and that doing so is both a violation of counsel's duties to his client and egregious conduct that
threatens the fairness of the proceeding.”  535 F.3d at 971.
Mr. Kincaid showed that his plea was not voluntary because it was coerced, and his
statements to the contrary at the change of plea hearing do not disprove this as the State argues.
5
(Resp. Br., pp.10-11.)  Indeed, the “entire record” in this case does not demonstrate that
Mr. Kincaid entered his plea and waived his right to a jury trial voluntarily. See State v. Heredia,
144 Idaho 95, 97 (2007) (emphasis added).  His attorney admitted he threatened to withdraw if
Mr. Kincaid did not take his advice and plead guilty, and that therefore Mr. Kincaid’s plea was
not “wholly voluntary.”  (7/17/17 Tr., p.11, L.5 – p.12, L.16.)  As such, Mr. Kincaid established
a just reason for withdrawing his guilty plea, and the district court abused its discretion when it
denied his motion to withdraw his plea because it applied an incorrect legal standard.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Kincaid respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s judgment of
conviction and its orders denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and imposing fines for
crimes of violence, and remand the case for further proceedings.
DATED this 9th day of November, 2018.
/s/ Reed P. Anderson
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